A book that divides its sections like Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophico demands careful reading. Furthermore, the book by Tiziana Andina entitled The Problem of Perception in Nietzsche Philosophy is prefaced by Maurizio Ferraris, who is the Director of a series of studies of The Laboratory for Ontology in Turin. Approaching Andina’s book, one realizes that it is a remarkable work, an important contribution to Nietzsche studies; this is because her scientific and philosophical knowl...

R. M. Friedberg demonstrated the existence of a recursive functional that agrees with no Banach-Mazur functional on the class of recursive functions. In this paper Friedberg's result is generalized to both α-recursive functionals and weak α-recursive functionals for all admissible ordinals α such that $\lambda , where α * is the Σ 1 -projectum of α and λ is the Σ 2 -cofinality of α. The theorem is also established for the metarecursive case, α = ω 1 , (...) where α * = λ = ω. (shrink)

Dans cet article, on soutient que Merleau-Ponty, à la fin de sa production philosophique, réhabilite ontologiquement le naturalisme caractéristique à la psychanalyse freudienne. Le philosophe identifie, dans le naturalisme articulé par Freud dans sa théorie, une description de la Nature qui, contrairement au subjectivisme philosophique des philosophies de la conscience, et aussi contrairement au mécanisme causal des sciences naturelles modernes, ne favorise pas une « image fantastique de l’homme, de l’esprit et de l’histoire » contraposée à l’inexorable existence d’une Nature (...) en soi. Ainsi, faire une « psychanalyse de la Nature », analyser les motifs de la réévaluation positive de la théorie freudienne dans les textes ultimes de Merleau-Ponty, implique faire ce qui a été l’intention du philosophe tout au long de la critique dirigée à la psychanalyse, c’est-à-dire : extraire de la théorie psychanalytique freudienne des conséquences philosophiques d’un certain ordre, ce que Freud n’a pas été capable de faire – et qui n’était pas non plus son but.In this article we maintain that at the end of his philosophical work, Merleau-Ponty ontologically rehabilitates the naturalism characteristic of Freudian psychoanalysis. In the naturalism articulated by Freud in his theoretical work, Merleau-Ponty identifies a description of Nature that, contrary to the subjectivism of philosophies of consciousness and also contrary to the mechanistic causality of the contemporary natural sciences, does not favor the “fantastic image of man, spirit and history,” counter-posed to the inexorable existence of Nature in itself. Consequently, to do a psychoanalysis of Nature, to analyze the motifs of a positive reevaluation of Freudian theory in Merleau-Ponty’s last works, implies fulfilling the intention he held all through his critique of psychoanalysis. That is to say, it implies extracting from Freudian psychoanalytic theory particular philosophical results, which Freud himself was not able to do—and which was not his aim.In questo articolo sosteniamo che Merleau-Ponty, al termine del suo percorso filosofico, arriva a riabilitare ontologicamente il naturalismo caratteristico della psicoanalisi freudiana. Il filosofo identifica nel naturalismo articolato da Freud una descrizione della Natura che, contrariamente al soggettivismo delle filosofie della coscienza, e, simmetricamente, al meccanicismo delle moderne scienze naturali, cessa di promuovere un’“immagine fantastica dell’uomo, dello spirito e della storia” contrapposta all’esistenza inesorabile di una Natura in sé. Così, svolgere l’idea di una “psicoanalisi della Natura”, e analizzare i motivi della rivalutazione della teoria freudiana negli ultimi testi di Merleau-Ponty, significa prolungare quella che è stata l’intenzione del filosofo lungo l’intero percorso della sua critica alla psicoanalisi: e cioè estrarre dalla teoria psicoanalitica freudiana conseguenze filosofiche appartenenti a un ordine che Freud non ha saputo raggiungere né si è dato il compito di raggiungere. (shrink)

In questo articolo i doni di cui Gerolamo ringrazia Eustochio e Marcella (epist. 31 e 44) sono riletti alla luce della tradizione classica dello scambio di regali, collegata specialmente ai Saturnalia: infatti, da un lato, essi trovano riscontro negli Xenia e negli Apohoreta di Marziale; dall’altro, Gerolamo, quando ne fornisce un’interpretazione, si conforma a un tipo di ricezione attiva del dono – una sua “decifrazione” –, che talora è attestata nella tradizione antica, specialmente saturnalizia (cfr. e.g. Petron. 56). In (...) termini più generali, Gerolamo realizza un’appropriazione cristiana dello scambio dei regali, offrendo un saggio di come la nuova “aristocrazia della fede”, da lui propugnata, non disdegni di rivivere i “riti” e l’etichetta propri delle élites, con l’intenzione sia di esserne legittimata agli occhi del mondo, sia – forse – di restituirli al loro significato vero. (shrink)

Massimo Reichlin, Fondamenti di bioetica; Antonio D'Aloia, a cura di, La tempesta del Covid. Dimensioni bioetiche; Maria Zanichelli, a cura di, La persona come categoria bioetica. Prospettive umanistiche; Ferruccio Andolfi, a cura di, L'uomo e l'unico; Roberto Cipriani, L'incerta fede. Un'indagine quanti-qualitativa in Italia; Marcella D'Abbiero, Affetti privati, pubbliche virtù. La psiche come fattore politico.

Herbert Marcuse; Jürgen Habermas; Alfred Schmidt; et al., "Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse." Suhrkamp, 1968. Jean-Michel Palmier, "Présentation d'Herbert Marcuse." Union générale d'éditions, 1968. Tito Perlini, "Che cosa ha veramente detto Marcuse." Ubaldini Editore, 1968. Dieter Ulle; Ju. Zemoshkin; N. Motroshlova; et al., "E' rivoluzionaria la dottrina di Marcuse?" Borla, 1969.

Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest (...) that reasons-first epistemology might have within an evidentialist framework. (shrink)

In juxtaposition with the myth and tragedy of Ovid’s Medea, this paper investigates the possibility within the Kantian conception of agency of understanding moral evil as acting against one’s better judgment. It defends the thesis that in Kant self-deception, i. e. the intentional untruthfulness to oneself, provides the fundamental structure for choosing against the moral law. I argue that, as Kant’s thought progresses, self-deception slowly proceeds to become the paradigmatic case of moral evil. This is discussed with regard to two (...) important topics in his later moral philosophy: the doctrine of radical evil and the crucial role of the duty of truthfulness in ethics. The inquiry into Kant’s theory of conscience unfolds both against this theoretical background and in light of its historical roots in the polemic against casuistry and probabilism. This contribution closes with a brief look at the tools Kant implements to counter this tendency to self-deception in moral judgment and particularly at the role casuistry plays within his conception of moral education. (shrink)

In two recent articles, Travis Dumsday has formulated a response to the problem of divine hiddenness on the basis of the Christian doctrine—especially Aquinas’s thought. I agree with Dumsday that Christians qua Christians can significantly contribute to the debate in question. However, in both articles the author overlooks a decisive aspect of Aquinas’s doctrine of faith and the Christian teachings that trace back to it. This article dwells on Dumsday’s interpretation of Aquinas’s thought, and from within my argument proposes a (...) different response to the problem of divine hiddenness. (shrink)

Belum begitu lama dua buah berita menggoncangkan dunia (astro-fisika). Yang pertama, CERN, Pusat penelitian atom di Geneva, yang dalam dua eksperimen berturut-turut menemukan bahwa neutrino (bagian mikro paling kecil) bergerak dengan kecepatan sedikit melampaui kecepatan cahaya. Yang kedua, pada minggu kedua Januari yang lalu pengamatan astronomis mutakhir menengarai bahwa dalam Bimasakti kita rata-rata setiap dari 10 milyar bintangnya mempunyai sekurang-kurangnya satu planet yang mirip dengan planet kita, bumi. Berita pertama begitu dahsyat sehingga para ahli fisika yang membuat eksperimen itu belum (...) mau mempercayainya, karena kalau amatan mereka betul, salah satu pilar fisika modern—teori relativitas khusus Einstein— runtuh. Sebuah revolusi baru dalam fisika. Salah satu implikasinya: kemungkinan menjalin komunikasi dengan extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI)—kalau ada—bertambah besar. Berita kedua lebih dahsyat lagi implikasinya. Sampai sekarang banyak astronom berpendapat bahwa probabilitas terjadinya planet dengan ciri-ciri seperti bumi adalah sedemikian kecil sehingga tidak mustahil kalau manusia merupakan satu-satunya makhluk berakal-budi di alam raya. Tetapi kalau di Bimasakti kita saja—satu di antara (diperkirakan) 1011 Bimasakti di seluruh alam raya—terdapat 10 milyar planet mirip bumi, adanya makhluk berakal budi di luar bumi (aliens) merupakan kemungkinan kuat. Dua penemuan ini mengangkat salah satu tantangan paling serius bagi teologi Kristiani: kalau ada makhluk berakal budi di tempat lain di alam raya, apa implikasinya bagi inti iman Kristiani, peristiwa Yesus Kristus? Apakah mereka juga perlu ditebus dari dosa? Dan kalau perlu, apakah karya penebusan Yesus juga berlaku bagi mereka? Kalau penyelamatan ilahi di planet-planet tidak berkaitan dengan Yesus Kristus, apa Yesus Kristus masih mempunyai relevansi universal dalam rencana penyelamatan ilahi? Pertanyaan-pertanyaan ini bukanlah pertanyaan iseng-iseng, melainkan menyangkut hakikat iman Kristiani. Persis masalah inilah yang dibahas oleh Armin Kreiner—guru besar teologi fundamental pada Fakultas Teologi Katolik Universitas München—dalam bukunya (yang, sayang, baru tersedia dalam bahasa Jerman). Buku ini membahas tantangan bagi teologi Kristiani andaikata ternyata selain manusia ada makhluk berakal budi lain di alam raya......................................... Apakah Kreiner berhasil menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan teologis berat yang diajukannya sendiri? Inti masalahnya adalah bagaimana dua keyakinan berikut dapat dipersatukan. Pertama, bahwa kalau ada ETI di alam raya, mereka tidak kurang dicintai oleh Allah dari pada manusia bumi dan karena itu inkarnasi ilahi tidak mungkin merupakan kejadian hanya di planet bumi. Kedua, bahwa dalam manusia Yesus Allah mewahyukan diri sendiri secara unik dengan makna penyelamatan universal. Dan hal itu perlu dijawab tanpa jatuh ke dalam pluralisme relativistik àla Knitter, Hick dan Schmidt-Leukel di mana Yesus hanyalah salah satu dari pewahyuan diri Allah yang pada hakikatnya semua sama derajatnya. Kiranya Kreiner berhasil merumuskan tantangan. Ia menunjukkan arah pemecahannya, tetapi ia belum memecahkannya. Bisa diteliti apakah pemecahan dapat dicari ke arah pemikiran baru tentang Pan-en-teisme sebagai pola yang lebih cocok untuk memahami hubungan antara Sang Pencipta dan ciptaan, sebagaimana akhir-akhir ini diangkat oleh beberapa teolog (Herderkorrespondenz Spezial 2-2011). Yang jelas, kemungkinan adanya aliens menghadapkan teologi Kristiani dengan tantangannya yang barangkali paling berat, yang sampai sekarang pernah dihadapinya. Sebagai catatan penutup, tetap benar bahwa probabilitas adanya ETI, melawan segala tulisan populer dan ilmiah (sampai sekarang), tetap minim! Probabilitas matematis bahwa di sebuah planet dengan kondisi-kondisi seperti bumi kita terjadi evolusi sampai ke kehidupan intelektual adalah kurang dari satu di antara 10100 (bdk. Erbrich, 1988, dll.). Kalaupun dalam setiap dari seluruh 1011 Bimasakti terdapat 10.000 planet mirip bumi, maka jumlah planet di alam raya yang kondisi-kondisinya mirip bumi adalah 1015. Jadi probabilitas adanya ETI tetap teramat rendah. Kemungkinan besar kita tidak pernah akan mengetahui apakah ada ETI. Selama itu pertimbangan-pertimbangan dramatis di atas bisa saja hanyalah sebuah permainan teologis, namun dengan daya tantang yang memang tinggi. (Franz Magnis-Suseno, Program Pascasarjana, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)

In these replies, I react to comments on my paper “Facts about Incoherence as Non-Evidential Epistemic Reasons”, provided by Aleks Knoks, Sebastian Schmidt, Keshav Singh, and Conor McHugh. I discuss potential counterexamples to my claim that the fact that the subject’s doxastic attitudes are incoherent is an epistemic reason for her to suspend; whether such incoherence-based reasons bear on individual attitudes or only on combinations of attitudes; the prospects of restricting evidentialism about epistemic reasons to reasons to believe; whether (...) incoherence-based reasons are truly epistemic; the alleged normative and motivational expendability of incoherence-based reasons; the possibility of incoherence-based reasons to suspend without actual belief in the incoherent propositions; the relationship between suspension, inquiry, and incoherence; and the nature of suspension of judgment. (shrink)

In epoca medievale si è molto discusso su alcuni concetti chiave come prova o giustificazione. La teoria della prova contenuta nei trattati di logica medievale prende il nome tecnico di consequentia, che è un tipo di ragionamento fondato sul passaggio dalla concessione (o negazione) di uno o più enunciati denominati antecedenti alla concessione (o negazione) di uno o più enunciati denominati conseguenti. Questo tipo di teoria ha avuto un correlato a livello dei singoli termini che compongono l’enunciato all'interno della teoria (...) nota come suppositio terminorum. Prende, infatti, il nome di descensus, la regola che permette la verifica del passaggio da un termine maggiore (un termine comune) ad un termine minore (che denota individui). La stessa definizione di alcune ramificazioni della teoria della suppositio è col-legata alla possibilità di ammettere o meno il descensus cioè questa "discesa" da un termine comune ad una congiunzione o disgiunzione di termini singolari. Il presente lavoro intende descrivere la teoria del descensus come un tipo particolare di consequentia mostrandone le connessioni con le moderne tecniche logiche. I trattati che si affronteranno appartengono al XIV e al XV secolo, cioè ad un periodo caratterizzato da una sistemazione della materia che li rende confrontabili con un quadro teorico unitario. (shrink)

The present article proposes a ‘heretic’ reading of Jan Patočka’s last work, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, usually considered as a profound philosophical reflection upon the nihili...

Some of the manuscripts once part of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s collection transmit autograph notes, which have been useful to reconstruct his library. A peculiar case is represented by the notes transmitted in a codex containing the Latin translation of Moses Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed. These notes are actual corrections to the translation made mostly on the basis of a comparison with the Hebrew text, while in some other cases they derive from a specific interpretation. The aim of this (...) paper is to present some characteristics of the textual revisions, in particular with reference to the Hebrew source. The palaeographic data demonstrate Pico’s direct involvement, which leads to the question of the authorship of these notes, namely if they were the result of an autonomous work or of a collaboration with some other scholar. (shrink)

Criminal attempts require intent to commit an offence. But what constitutes such intent? Some cases are fairly straightforward. I act with intent to convert stolen goods if I intend that the goods I purchase be stolen. A man acts with intent to commit rape if he intends that the sexual intercourse be non-consensual. Other cases leave room for reasonable disagreement. Did a man intend to convert criminal property when he purchased goods which he suspected might be stolen? And did a (...) man intend to rape a woman when he tried to have intercourse with her and was reckless about consent? Does recklessness as to the circumstance elements of an offence suffice for intent? Building on the view that attempts are failed attacks (as opposed to acts of endangerment), I argue that recklessness about circumstances is not enough for intent since such recklessness amounts to an act of endangerment. This is not to suggest that a man does nothing wrong in trying to have sex with a woman while being reckless about consent; it is to argue that he should be convicted of an endangerment offence, rather than an attempt. If we take seriously the idea that attempts are failed attacks, and that attacks and endangerments constitute different types of moral wrong, we have good reason to preserve this distinction in our offence labels by insisting that the fault element for attempts should require at least knowledge or belief as to the relevant circumstances of an offence. (shrink)

A definition of nonstandard universe which gets over the limitation to the finite levels of the cumulative hierarchy is proposed. Though necessarily nonwellfounded, nonstandard universes are arranged in strata in the likeness of superstructures and allow a rank function taking linearly ordered values. Nonstandard universes are also constructed which model the whole ZFC theory without regularity and satisfy the κ-saturation property.

This article aims to compare the national legal systems that regulate biomedical research in an industrialized country (United States) and a developing country (Venezuela). A new international order is emerging in which Europe, Japan and the United States (US) are revising common guidelines and harmonizing standards. In this article, we analyze – as an example – the US system. This system is controlled by a federal agency structured to regulate research funded by the federal government uniformly, either in the US (...) or abroad. In contrast, in Venezuela, a developing country, the creation of a centralized system is a slow process. Different types of ethical committees review research projects using non-uniform criteria. Consequently, various parallel organizations that conduct biomedical research, such as universities, research institutes and private hospitals have diverse regulations operating at a local level. Thus, the most relevant difference between the Venezuelan and the US systems is the degree of standardization. In the US, the review process is performed by institutional review boards (IRBs), which have a similar organization and maintain relationships with a centralized agency, following standard regulations. Although new proposals for establishing national regulations are currently being considered in Venezuela, the success of these initiatives will depend on promoting governmental efforts to create a more structured centralized system supported by a national regulatory framework. This system will need governmental financial support at all levels. This article proposes an integrated system to regulate research with human participants in Venezuela and other developing countries. (shrink)